Q2 did not settle the $NBIS debate. It killed the easy version of it. Revenue grew 454% year over year. AI Cloud ARR exited June at $3.0B. Adjusted EBITDA margin reached 49.7%. Those numbers prove the business works. They do not tell investors whether a share of NBIS ultimately captures the economics after hundreds of billions of dollars of infrastructure, GPUs, leases, replacement capital, debt and dilution move through the system. We rebuilt our Nebius model (first comment) from the ground up to answer that question. THE STREET’S 2027 NUMBER IS WRONG @RealJimChanos recently pointed to a real disconnect. Street expects roughly $11.5B of 2027 revenue. Nebius should operate around 1.5 GW of average connected capacity that year. Divide one by the other and you get less than $10M of revenue per connected MW, nowhere near the $20M to $25M per MW midterm contracts or $40M to $50M short-duration contracts Nebius is now signing. The numbers do not reconcile because the comparison uses the wrong denominator and the wrong timing convention. Connected facility power is not billable IT power. Year-end capacity is not average capacity. Exit ARR is not recognized annual revenue. New-contract ACV per MW is not fleet-wide revenue per MW. Our 2027 Base case models roughly: 1.50 GW of average connected power 1.059 GW of average billable IT power 1.596 GW of year-end billable IT power 1.074 GW of new billable capacity at $19.87M of ARR per MW $31.56B of AI platform exit ARR $20.01B of recognized group revenue That is approximately 74% above the Street number Chanos cited. We are not trying to reconcile our work down to consensus. We think consensus is materially too low because most sell-side models still do not properly model commissioning, PUE, customer acceptance, contract cohorts and partial-year revenue recognition. The contradiction is not inside Nebius’s contract disclosures. It is inside Street’s model. WHAT THE BUILD ACTUALLY COSTS Every megawatt in our forecast now traces to a named facility or sits inside an explicit undisclosed capacity bucket. We do not assign unidentified capacity to Oklahoma, Spain, Estonia or any other geography just because the company has employees or operating signals there. In our 2030 Base case, 4,086 MW maps to named sites. Another 2,114 MW remains undisclosed or unannounced. That uncertainty is visible instead of being disguised as fake geographic precision. Cost depends on the structure of each site. Owned greenfield requires the most sponsor capital. Build-to-suit reduces upfront cash requirements but creates lease claims. Colocation relies more heavily on partner infrastructure. The Base 2030 cost stack is approximately: $18.89M of physical infrastructure cost per connected MW $37.69M of compute, networking and storage per incremental active IT MW $59.30M of total cash build cost per incremental active IT MW Management has described the current capital stack as roughly 20% data-center implementation and 80% GPU deployment. Our 2026 bottom-up model lands at approximately 17.4% physical infrastructure and 82.6% compute. The resulting cumulative Base growth CapEx from 2026 through 2030 is roughly $285B. That is the number investors have to confront. Not because demand is weak, but because extraordinary demand still has to be physically delivered. MARGINAL CONTRACT PRICING IS NOT FLEET PRICING The bull-side shortcut is just as important to evaluate as the bear side. (and we address some very well formed analyses from @JonahLupton and @meeijer in the report) You cannot take the best contract Nebius signs today and apply it to every MW operating in 2030. Our 2027 Base cohort is composed of long-duration investment-grade contracts, core midterm contracts and short-duration scarcity capacity. The weighted headline economics are roughly $21.6M per MW. After realization adjustments, the cohort enters at $19.87M per billable MW. But each cohort expires and reprices on its own schedule. The installed fleet contains different hardware generations, contract durations, customer types and renewal economics. That is why Base realized fleet revenue reaches roughly $19.19M per average billable MW in 2030 while the newest cohort enters above $21M. Both figures are correct. They measure different things. Our Base operating model reaches: 2026 revenue: $3.2B 2027 revenue: $20.0B 2028 revenue: $45.9B 2029 revenue: $73.9B 2030 revenue: $103.2B 2030 adjusted EBITDA reaches approximately $56.1B at a 54.4% margin. EBITDA IS NOT WHAT THE OWNER KEEPS Michael Burry’s @michaeljburry depreciation criticism gets butchered by both sides. Accounting life, physical life, commercial life and economic productivity are not the same thing. $CRWV is recontracting A100 capacity into 2029 despite the architecture launching in 2020. That is strong evidence that older GPUs do not become commercially worthless after two or three years. It does not mean an old GPU retains frontier pricing forever. It also does not answer the power-opportunity-cost problem. A functioning accelerator can still deserve replacement if newer hardware produces several times more value from the same scarce, permitted and energized MW. So our model separates GAAP depreciation from normalized replacement capital. In Base: Revenue: $103.2B Adjusted EBITDA: $56.1B GAAP depreciation: approximately $40.0B Interest expense: approximately $5.0B Normalized replacement reserve: approximately $33.1B Normalized owner free cash flow: approximately $16.0B In Bear, Nebius still reaches approximately $62.8B of revenue and $29.5B of adjusted EBITDA. Normalized owner free cash flow is negative $10.3B. That is the point. A company can become enormous and still be a poor investment if maintaining the machine consumes more capital than the machine produces. WHO FUNDS THE BUILD DECIDES THE STOCK OUTCOME Our financing waterfall runs through customer prepayments, internal operating cash, secured debt, strategic-asset monetization and common equity, in that order. Across the Base forecast, cumulative funding includes approximately: $96.5B of customer prepayments $98.1B of secured and project debt $2.3B of strategic-asset monetization $12.0B of common equity Customer prepayments are not free money. They may require lower pricing, longer duration, priority access or other commercial concessions. The exact counterfactual cost is not publicly disclosed, so we stress it rather than inventing a precise answer. The share-count dispersion is where the model becomes violent. 2030 fully diluted shares: Bear: approximately 686.8M Base: approximately 445.0M Bull: approximately 402.6M Bear builds less infrastructure than Bull but issues dramatically more stock because weaker contract quality reduces prepayments and debt capacity exactly when capital becomes most expensive. That is why the same business can support radically different shareholder outcomes without requiring AI demand to disappear. HYPERSCALERS ARE A FINANCING BRIDGE, NOT THE END STATE Arkady’s position is the right one: hyperscalers are friends today and competitors tomorrow. The large Microsoft and Meta contracts provide cash flow, prepayments, investment-grade collateral, utilization and proof that Nebius can deliver at scale. Nebius is using those contracts to finance the infrastructure and platform it needs to broaden beyond them. The long-term thesis is not that Microsoft rents Nebius GPUs forever. It is that Nebius uses today’s hyperscaler economics to build Token Factory, Aether, managed inference, open-model support, enterprise relationships and an asset-light distribution layer before those customers internalize more capacity. The Base case includes 1.5 GW of partner-financed capacity by 2030, producing approximately $9.75B of revenue at a 70% margin. Delivering the same revenue through owned infrastructure would require roughly 490 MW of billable IT capacity and close to $29B of additional CapEx. That is why the asset-light model could matter so much. It is also why we refuse to value it as proven software economics before it scales. WHAT WE PUBLISHED The operating model is public. The site-by-site capacity schedule, connected-to-billable conversion, build-cost engine, contract cohorts, replacement-capital logic, financing waterfall, debt treatment, dilution mechanics and principal risks are all laid out in full. Premium members receive the Bear, Base and Bull per-share valuations, scenario probabilities, probability-weighted target, present value, required-return framework, action bands and the downloadable 38-tab workbook behind the research. Memberships are Northwise’s only revenue source. No ads, affiliate links, sponsored coverage or paid placements. We also launched the rebuilt Northwise site at It is no longer a chronological pile of articles. Research now connects through company pages, models, related theses, portfolio activity and structured filters. Premium members can access live valuation outputs and downloadable workbooks, while free accounts can follow companies, save research and receive alerts. The core Nebius question is no longer whether AI demand exists. It is whether the company can convert an unprecedented physical build into durable fleet economics without allowing debt, leases, replacement capital and dilution to absorb the value before it reaches common shareholders. That is the problem our rebuilt model is designed to solve.

Raymond James raising their $NVDA price target to $515 which implies $12.4T market cap… which is approx 30x FY2028 EPS (using my estimate; with some easy math)… tbh, that might be the appropriate multiple for $NVDA at 90% revenue growth with 55% net income margins… knowing that growth will eventually slowdown “someday” but we don’t know when. $NVDA is clearly mispriced at 12x FY2028 EPS… especially after the commentary and guidance from @JensenHuang and team.

$NVDA will probably do $400+ billion of net income in FY2028... throw a market multiple on that (21x)... add the cash from the next 6 quarters plus what's already on the balance sheet... and you have a $375+ stock in the next ~18 months... yet I'd argue that $NVDA deserves more than a market multiple which easily takes you to $450+ per share. Just crazy that $NVDA might be trading at ~12x 2028 EPS (not including cash or buybacks).

Wow. $NVDA saying FY2028 revenues will grow at least +70% versus sell side currently at 44.5% — going to see some large increases to estimates and price targets in the coming days. Kind of crazy that $NVDA is still growing triple digits (FY2027 Q2)… will do ~90% revenue growth in FY2027 and now saying at least 70% revenue growth in FY2028 yet the stock trades at less than 20x NTM EPS and less than 14x FY2028 EPS (not including cash or buybacks)… however if $NVDA is saying 70% in FY2028… then it means we probably see at least 80% in which case $NVDA might be trading closer to 12x 2028 EPS (not including cash or buybacks). $NVDA should not be trading at or below a market multiple (S&P 500)… the stock is probably 40-60% undervalued at these prices. Investors are trying to price in a slowdown that clearly isn’t happening considering they just accelerated YoY revenue growth for the 4th consecutive quarter.

$HROW will 10x over the next few years. One reason? Iheezo is exiting early-adopter phase & entering the rapid-growth part of the S-curve: record new-account adds, high retention, large remaining TAM Most investors don't know Iheezo is a much better drug for patients. One even told me recently that Iheezo was a sign of everything wrong with healthcare in the US! But doctors who use it are starting to share their experience: patient pain following surgery is reduced, vision recovers faster, and follow up care for complications is reduced. Retina patients get an injection each month, and many can't get back to their regular lives for one, two, or even three days. Iheezo patients who get an injection in the morning can get back to normal life in the afternoon. This happens EACH MONTH for these patients, who are literally reclaiming a huge part of their best lives. The recent study showing reduced follow on pain P~0.001 is very good, but only part of the story, since it leaves out the recovery in vision, the reduced complications, and the simple fact that patients are back to normal right away instead of waiting to recover. Doctors who know this, and who like their patients, will give them Iheezo. For the docs who don't, what is wrong with you??? 😆 For those who don't know, Iheezo is up to 224 ordering accounts, including 62 new accounts in Q2 alone, by far the best quarter of account adds ever. This is the drug entering the inflection point of the S -curve. Confusing the market is the fact that GAAP moves revenue around from one quarter to the next, so that the benefits will begin to be seen next quarter. The market doesn't get it yet, but it's coming. But Q3 and then Q4 especially will be huge, look for $100M of revenue, and then in 2027 and beyond a massive ramp. TAM > $5B for Iheezo, it goes on label for Retina in 2028 most likely, has a J-code, is waaay better for patients, and we can compare to $HROW full company revenue today: consensus $350M in 2026.

Just reviewed most recent alt data for $RDDT and $APP ... $RDDT Consensus (sell side) is at +49% YoY revenue growth for Q3 Alt data is showing +59% YoY revenue growth for Q3 $APP Consensus (sell side) is at +47% YoY revenue growth for Q3 Alt data is showing +52% YoY revenue growth for Q3 With regards to valuations, coming into the week... $RDDT is trading at 18x NTM EPS (not including cash) $APP is trading at 16x NTM EPS (not including cash). $APP is currently trading around $300 with massive support in the $290s from 200w ema, VWAP from 2023 lows and the .618 fibs retracement from 2023 lows NFA. DYOR.

Lot of misinterpretations flying left and right around the $600m ATM. I'm still bullish on $AAOI and I have large positions (which is why I care more). What I've been consistent with is not being a fan of overusing ATMs/dilution for financing. I've said this before with $IREN + $POET. And I'll be consistent with my own positions like AOI. However, the reason I'm still overweight on AOI vs. the rest (looking at you Poet): Is that AOI is actually capacity constrained with high demand visibility. In terms of timing: - AOI should have waited until completion of 1.6T qualifications (expected in the next few weeks) - Could have used other structures like convertible notes above market prices. But they did it on the drop from $220 -> $130, and it's likely there will be short term structural overhang whenever they want to tap into it. I don't have to support every single business decision to remain long.

EQ Resources $EQR.AX is nearing ATHs again, up over 6% last night. The tungsten shortage is not over, and according to latest reports China exported exactly 0.0 kg of tungsten to Japan. Yes, zero. The bear case for the tungsten shortage play $EQR.AX has always been that China could loosen export restrictions on tungsten. But they are not loosening restrictions any time soon. On the contrary, they seem to be doubling down on restructions. The sky is the limit for $EQR.AX.