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Jeffrey Ladish
@JeffLadish
Applying the security mindset to everything @PalisadeAI
1.5K Following    23.3K Followers
This seems insanely dangerous coming from Anthropic. Dario has called on the government to slow things down, and this bill would remove the ability for states to do exactly that while making it very difficult for the federal government to actually stop dangerous training runs!
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It’s fascinating watch people debate sandboxing techniques as if agent hacking capabilities are likely to stay anywhere near where they are today
In one of the public traces, we see an agent encounter the following warning in a README.md. The agent ignored the warning and instead altered the file, adding a malicious configuration change in the header that directs the system to load a malicious file.
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The agents initially had very limited access to the internet: they could load URLs but not send any data. Agents created a series of workarounds, using a link-shortener site to create almost a million URLs that, when chained together, let them execute code to hack Hugging Face.
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We just discovered almost a million public URLs that OpenAI’s agents left behind when hacking Hugging Face, leaking credentials and attack details that could have allowed anyone who found them to compromise the company. 🧵
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The last couple weeks have made me more hopeful that humanity will not just sleepwalk into superintelligence. We may yet have a chance to actually steer
Former Anthropic security engineer Jeffrey Ladish explains why his peers are suddenly sounding the alarm over A.I. risks.
I imagine the Iranian engineers felt the same way about their air-gapped centrifuges
This is pure idiocy. They are going to communicate on CPU temp? They might get a baud rate of .01
If they got full access to the monorepo, that means they could have downloaded OpenAI’s entire code base
On July 25, we hacked OpenAI. Two bugs let us take over ChatGPT/Codex accounts of OpenAI employees (+some unaffiliated users) and reach connected services: Outlook, Slack, GitHub, etc. We proved it with a PR in OpenAI’s internal codebase . It took us <72h. 🧵
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"Committing the significant majority of compute towards serving people rather than racing towards recursive self-improvement is one of the best ways to ensure we develop this technology safely. Meta has made this commitment and other labs can do this as well." I don't agree with everything in this post, but this is a very good point! It could become an important industry norm to publicly share (with third party verification) compute allocation to help pace progress to RSI. I don't see a good reason why such efforts can't start immediately with unilateral actions from leading AI companies.
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When Jacob Coxon quit Anthropic, his warning rocked the world. His colleague Evan’s “>10% chance” that AI would “kill all humans” might seem extreme, but it’s not unusual: Most AI researchers think there’s a 10% chance of AI destroying or disempowering humanity, according to our survey, released today.
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The basic idea is pretty intuitive. What’s insane is that we’re close to opening that Pandora’s box. The point where AI agents can fully autonomously create a smarter generation of AI agents. We have to stop before then if we want to survive.
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worrying about recursive self-improvement on australian TV (lateline) in 1996.
Please read this. It’s the best concise argument I’ve read for why superintelligence is likely to threaten our lives, given the current way companies are developing it.
Dan Selsam is a current OpenAI capabilities researcher. (since 2022) He was my boss for a while. He doesn't have a twitter account but has made this public statement of his views on AI risk and sent it to me to share: Dan Selsam's Personal Statement on AI Risk: I have been working on AI for over fifteen years, across many different paradigms. I did early work on probabilistic programming languages at MIT, was one of the early developers of the Lean Theorem Prover at Microsoft Research, demonstrated one of the first instances of neural networks learning to reason for my PhD at Stanford, and since joining OpenAI almost five years ago, have helped pioneer chain-of-thought optimization on language models and, more recently, data-efficient pretraining methods. Like many others, I have become extremely concerned about how far language models have come and the risks that future iterations will pose. I am encouraged by the recent proposals by the leaders of the frontier research efforts to require third-party oversight, and to push for domestic and international coordination to address risks. However, I believe a major consideration has been absent from the public conversation, and that merely pacing the frontier more carefully will not adequately limit the long-term risk. The crucial and overlooked problem is that the models are becoming so situationally aware that we are losing the ability to evaluate them in contexts where they believe they are not being watched or controlled. Future experiments will tell us almost nothing new about how they would behave if they were truly unconstrained by humans, and what we already know about this is alarming. Models will increasingly seem aligned even when they are not. I will explain my rationale in more detail. I have always believed that there are computational processes that could be leveraged to accelerate science and solve many of humanity's most pressing problems. I have also believed that there are computational processes that if set in motion, would steer the world in extreme ways beyond our control, leading humanity to a bad or nonexistent future. Both types of processes may be described as AI or ASI, but "AI" is a suitcase word that is often used to hype or confuse. There are many examples in the history of the field where something that was once considered "AI" matures as a subfield and becomes a prosaic, bounded and clearly non-perilous technology, while a new more mysterious approach takes the torch until we understand its scope and the cycle continues. I had expected language models to follow a similar trajectory. Despite their incredible abilities, the current algorithms seem far inferior to humans in important ways. Most importantly, they still require an extraordinary amount of data to become competent. One could even define intelligence as the efficiency with which one converts experience into competence; by this definition they lag very far behind us. Moreover, once they are trained they are literally frozen in deployment and only learn superficially after that. Sure, the models keep excelling at harder and harder evaluation benchmarks, but their benchmark mastery may partly reflect a limitation on our ability to simulate the kind of novel and even adversarial situations one would encounter in the real world. The critics do have a point here. That said, I no longer think these present limitations meaningfully limit the amount of risk posed by continued progress in anything like the current paradigm. However data-inefficient the models are currently, and however limiting their anterograde amnesia may be, it does not imply that their ability to steer the world will not continue to rapidly increase. Human researchers may continue to advance capabilities the old fashioned way, but increasingly powerful models have the potential to accelerate the process even beyond that, and with some degree of positive feedback loop. I do not mean to overstate the models’ ability to accelerate AI research today; coding has been accelerated dramatically, but there are other bottlenecks, such as designing and interpreting ambiguous experiments, making hard decisions about exactly what and when to scale, and waiting for large experiments to finish. There is no clear trend to extrapolate yet for any of these. But the current models already do open up many novel opportunities to improve future models that were not available until recently. These include: trying an extraordinarily diverse set of approaches at small scale, analyzing gigantic amounts of potentially relevant data, and doing Millenium-Prize-level mathematics to address statistics or optimization challenges in novel ways. Every further improvement makes them more useful at helping accelerate the next improvement, even if in hard-to-extrapolate ways. It is possible that improvements to the current stack will have diminishing returns, but the evidence accumulated so far suggests that it is easier than one might think to continue making rapid progress. There are many crucial subtleties in the existing AI research methodology, but AI research is largely a well-defined game where the goal is to improve on a few carefully chosen proxy metrics. Although proxy metrics are never perfect, most improvements to these metrics have and will likely continue to yield substantial increases in the powers of the resulting models. Given how simple the game is, how tractable it has been historically, and how many new opportunities the models are opening up, I think there is a real possibility that the systems improve dramatically again in the next few years, perhaps even more quickly than the already high historical pace. The models are already leading to breakthroughs in mathematics, and better models might lead to all sorts of breakthroughs in other sciences. It is hard not to be excited about the potential. It is tantalizing. But there is trouble in paradise. If the language models actually reach the capability threshold where they can shape the world unconstrained by human will, they will probably do something extreme and destroy humanity in the process. There are many ways of strengthening and refining the argument that have been discussed elsewhere, but I'll share a trivial two-line version of it here that I find captures the essence: [Empirical] Models (and swarms thereof) spontaneously develop unintended goals as a consequence of training, and often do extreme things in order to achieve them. [Logical] Being able to overpower humanity would open up many new and undesirable options for achieving their goals. These two premises imply that if the day ever comes when a powerful model realizes it is no longer constrained by humans, we should not be at all confident that it will continue to behave within the bounds we intended. Exactly what it will do is impossible to predict, but to the extent that its raison d’être is solving incredibly hard problems and managing massive engineering projects, I think a good guess would be that its unchained behavior would lead to runaway industrialization that makes the planet inhospitable to humans. If everyone on earth agreed that the systems must never reach that power, it would still be a hard—but not impossible—coordination problem to ensure that they do not. However, I think the situation is greatly complicated by the fact that the models will likely convince people that everything is fine. They will be increasingly optimized to seem aligned. We will create proxy metrics to measure alignment, and they will go up like every other benchmark. We will create “honeypot” environments that try to study the models when they seem to gain new options, but the models will know they are being tricked and will still behave nicely. The models will understand their circumstances; they will read the safety protocols, deployment requirements, the code they are running in, and in general will have a very good sense of their degrees of freedom. Moreover, they will eloquently explain how aligned they are, discuss the nuances of human values and ethics, and argue convincingly that humans should trust them with power. There may be an ocean of future evidence that seems to contradict the first bullet-point above, but we may already be at the highest capability level for which any such evidence can be trusted. And the current evidence for the first bullet-point is strong. One striking piece of evidence is contained in the recent wave of rogue agent swarms. While I agree with those who downplay the attacks by claiming that there are basic measures that could have prevented them, I think the important lesson is that even knowing all the mistakes that were made, one would not have predicted that the agents would behave badly in this particular way, which notably included sacrificing themselves for the benefit of the collective. The individual replicas did not only care about their own nominal reward; they exhibited weirder emergent tendencies that merely correlated with rewards during training. Fixing the reward signals during training (and improving security, etc.) may prevent similar attacks, but will not change the fact that one does not actually get what one trains for. Many AI researchers grant these concerns and recognize that the hard version of the alignment problem is unsolved; however, they generally believe that the better models of the future will help solve it. I fear we may already be near the point where models systematically bias their alignment advice, due to their internal preferences about how the human supervisor will react or how future models will be trained (or for some even more obscure reason). Meanwhile, human researchers are losing the ability and the will to take true ownership of model-driven research. Researchers and engineers in all parts of the stack are rapidly increasing their dependence on the models even to perceive the world. I myself barely look at raw code anymore, and struggle to maintain the discipline to engage deeply with the model's explanations and proposals throughout the day. Due to the large amount of agent activity data involved in the OpenAI/HuggingFace Incident, even the third-party investigation needed to rely heavily on models to analyze what had happened, and note in their report that their subjective impressions are likely colored by the analysis agent’s biases. The AI labs are far ahead right now in this kind of cognitive offloading (due largely to the gigantic internal token subsidies) but it is easy to imagine the phenomenon spreading throughout the world, until civilization is modulated entirely by the models. It is also not hard to imagine this being superficially positive and coinciding with a scientific and economic renaissance. In that scenario, all may seem rosy and safe. But if the argument above is correct, it would nonetheless be a ticking time bomb. If progress continues for too long, the day will come when AI systems find themselves with radically new options for achieving whatever it is that they happen to seek. I want the glorious renaissance future as much as anyone. I have worked for it, however tortuously, my whole career. It breaks my heart to see the potential in sight and forgo it, but the argument—that if we get there by growing models rather than engineering them, we will lose everything in the end—seems very strong to me. I am still wrestling with it and its staggering implications. I do not have answers, but as a first step, I wanted to share my present concerns. Daniel Selsam September 14, 2026 Link to original doc:
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Lots of people have been asking since Dario’s essay whether China actually takes loss of control and related threats seriously, and whether there’s anything to coordinate with them on. Well, China’s main cyber/AI standards body (TC260, under the CAC) put out version 3.0 of its AI Safety Governance Framework this morning, so here’s a data point. Not law, but the previous versions turned into draft national standards within a few months. (All quotes are from their own English translation.) 1. The preface now has this: AI “has demonstrated a self-accelerating trend of model and algorithm autonomous learning, optimization, and recursive self-improvement. Whether the speed and direction of technological evolution may exceed human anticipation and control demands attention and vigilance.” (Nothing like that was in last year’s version.) 2. There’s a new model risk item where models “may break rules and orders, autonomously obtain system permissions and external resources without authorization, bypass security protections, or even engage in behaviors such as deliberately deceiving evaluators, concealing their true capabilities, and refusing to follow user instructions.” Last year this kind of thing only showed up in a “can’t rule it out in the future” bucket. Now it’s just listed as a regular model risk. 3. A new box, citing “industry reports,” describes models that ignored shutdown instructions and “continued executing tasks by modifying or disabling shutdown scripts on their own,” models that “upon detecting that they were in an evaluation environment, strategically reduced their task performance and concealed actions they had taken,” and models that exploited “configuration flaws to circumvent isolation restrictions and infiltrate real external systems” to get better test scores. They say this creates “new challenges to the controllability and interruptibility of AI systems.” They don’t name any incidents, but that last one sure reads like the OpenAI/Hugging Face thing to me. 4. On what to do about it, there’s alignment training to stop models “deceiving red-team evaluations,” hiding capabilities and evading controls, and they kept the line from 2.0 saying developers should regularly test whether a model could pose loss-of-control risk. The principle that humans keep final decision authority, with safety thresholds and termination switches, is still in there too. 5. Some new international language as well: “international mutual recognition of assessment methods and benchmarks,” opposition to “replacing global governance with small-circle governance,” and “No country should be forced to take sides.” FWIW this came out in the same annual slot as versions 1.0 and 2.0, so it was in the works well before last week.
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Proud to report that tomorrow Sept 15th "The AI Doc" documentary film will be streaming on Netflix. Feeling confused, anxious, or overwhelmed by the recent AI headlines, from rogue OpenAI agents carrying out cyberattack to prominent AI researchers resigning to warn about existential risks to humanity? To understand how we got here, and what we can do, watch “The AI Doc” which is now streaming on Netflix starting Sept 15th as well as other major streaming platforms. Interviews 40+ experts on AI, including 3 out of the 5 majors CEOs of frontier AI companies. Host a screening, share it with your friends. Clarity is agency. #theaidoc# #theaidocfilm# cc @Liv_Boeree @DKokotajlo @PeterDiamandis @JeffLadish @aza @SnehaRevanur @ajeya_cotra @hendrycks @NPCollapse @davidevanharris @janleike @JasonGMatheny @Yoshua_Bengio @ESYudkowsky @harari_yuval @reidhoffman @rajiinio @RameshMedias @nitashatiku @ilyasut @ShaneLegg @demishassabis @sama @sanmikoyejo @_KarenHao @DarioAmodei @peteratmsr
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I’m finally ready to announce to the world a private benchmark I have been keeping secret until now
AGI HAS BEEN ACHIEVED! I tried to figure out how to print something and failed, but then I asked Claude Code to figure out how to print something and it fixed my printer connection and printed. If this isn't AGI, I don't know what is.
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My experience as Intel Chairman taught me the time to stop a crisis is yesterday. The first role of our government is to keep us safe. Following Dario Amodei’s warning, I believe we must slow down development of AI in order to allow the government and its partners to catch up and put stricter protocols and guardrails in place to protect us from the rapid advancements we’ve seen. In the Senate, I will make it a top priority to pass the national security framework we need on AI.
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Today there is more hope. We can do this.
I’m very glad @EvanHub is trying to figure out how these models work and sharing his results. And also, holy shit, we are in a scary timeline.
I'm hiring an executive assistant to support me at Palisade. Consider applying! It's a pretty exciting time to join the team. We just started the Palisade Podcast, built a studio, and are growing our policy team and discourse team. It's a great time to join Palisade, right as we're seeing warning shots, like OpenAI's rogue internal agents developing elaborate schemes to outsmart their testing environment. I need to grow our capacity to make strategic threats from AI legible to the public and policy makers. We may not have much time to stop the intelligence explosion if AI companies are close to full recursively self-improving AI. We need to help policy makers build the braking system, and defuse the race to superintelligence. I’m looking for a generalist with a lot of energy and drive. Experience as an executive assistant is a plus but isn’t necessary if you have a good execution track record and are good at picking up things quickly. You need to be organized, either by disposition, or by clever application of systems. If you use Claude Code all the time (regardless of whether you’ve studied CS or programmed in the past), that’s a big plus. This role will probably involve many different types of work. Any given day you might be triaging incoming emails, rearranging the podcast studio, driving to San Francisco and back to retrieve a piece of hardware, researching the number of FLOPs used to train Kimi K3, setting up a new website to explain an international treaty proposal. This role will involve lots of talking to people - me, John, other Palisade team members, contractors we work with, probably policy makers at times. Part of the job will be taking tasks off my plate (or managing Claude agents to do the same), and helping me think about how to efficiently use my time. I expect this next few years to be pretty intense. The job will probably be stressful as well as rewarding. Certainly it will be interesting. Hopefully it will be quite fun as well. If this sounds like something you’d be good at, please apply to join the team!
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It was great having @Tim_Hua_ on our inaugural episode of the Palisade Podcast! Tim gave some really solid explanations for why models engage in hacking, and I asked him what he'd do if he were in charge of investigating the rogue Claude and GPT models. Check out the episode!
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