Pacing The Frontier is both (imo) the correct thing to do, but also incredibly beneficial to the frontier AI labs from an economics perspective.
It will allow them to slowly roll out intelligence, amortize models over longer periods of time, experience margin expansion over a lifecycle of a model for longer, and embed existing models into workflows that the longer they are "frontier" the lower churn will be (it will still be high).
It de-escalates the prisoner's dilemma and also allows them and the whole industry to exhale a bit on 2030+ capex existentialism even if just for a year or two, which matters a lot.
All of these things then flow into the idea that safety/alignment could have more resources, both financial (more FCF for the labs to deploy), as well as compute (inference scales perhaps less aggressively, post-training holds steady, pre-training maybe re-allocates a bit, and social capital wise safety/alignment viewed as main blocker to restart the other machines and thus becomes higher priority).
The main areas where this all is negative is that likely the neolabs would have less constraints placed upon them due to their (lack of) compute scale, and of course the whole "what do we do with china" problem.
I am in agreement with some's POV (
@hamandcheese notably discusses this as do others found in
@TheZvi latest round up - that we figure that out later though, and I hold some strange belief that outside of this, I could see China actually getting to a point of Pacing on their own.
I understand that many overintellectualize the incentives of the labs, and I'm not saying that Pacing is directly coming from an economic incentive versus a "long-tail let's not destroy humanity" one, but I do think it is hard to ignore that if regulatory capture in the traditional form doesn't work, Pacing is so economically dominant, and is a rare occasion to let air out of a bubble that is driven by a feeling of existential competition.