As Cyber Bill Amendment 164 goes to
@HouseofCommons for ping pong, I urge Ministers to read
@liambyrnemp Report.
What I said in
@UKHouseofLords: “So why do I support Amendment 164? (With
@TimClementJone1 @NickMarkham @JonathanCamrose )?Part 4 of the Bill rightly equips the Secretary of State with formidable powers to issue directions in the interests of national security. Yet, as the Bill stands, those powers risk operating in a strategic vacuum. If we are to empower Ministers to intervene decisively to protect our essential services and our critical supply chains, that intervention must be anchored to an objective, statutory assessment of who threatens us. We cannot defend what we value against an adversary whom we refuse to formally identify. Amendment 164 provides that essential statutory spine by establishing a clear, maintained register of foreign powers that pose an acute risk to our critical network and information systems—something that came home to us last week when so many of our systems nationally were attacked. We do not necessarily know by whom, but we can no doubt guess.
We certainly know that in the past the NHS was subjected to attacks by the regime in North Korea. Critically, this is not a political blacklist. It is not subject to diplomatic whim; it is an intelligence-led mechanism rooted in the hard, objective assessments of GCHQ. Where our intelligence agencies have confirmed that a foreign state or its proxies have perpetrated attacks against our essential services within the last seven years, or where they issue clear warnings of imminent peril, that state must be listed.The definition must be clear-eyed about modern authoritarian governance. In the People’s Republic of China, for instance, the state, the military and the Chinese Communist Party are inextricably fused. To assess state-backed cyber threats while ignoring the governing political party that directs them would be wilful blindness.This amendment closes that semantic loophole once and for all.
Furthermore, Amendment 164 demands that we confront our own domestic vulnerabilities. It requires the Secretary of State to review not merely attacks launched from across oceans but the profound risks inherent in foreign-owned or foreign-controlled infrastructure situated on our own soil. For far too long, across successive Administrations,our critical national infrastructure has been treated with commercial naivety rather than strategic discipline. By requiring the Government to conduct this review and lay a coherent action plan before
@UKParliament within 6 months,this amendment ends the era of bureaucratic drift.
Let me end by referring to the inquiry that I chaired on behalf of
@HumanRightsCtte into transnational repression. Our domestic policy’s failure is illustrated by the reluctance to act on the recommendation that the committee made unanimously to place China,the state we found was the most responsible for transnational repression in the UK, even more than Russia or Iran, in the foreign influence registration scheme’s top tier. Unlike with those two other countries,we have failed to do so.
When
@eliz_lloyd comes to reply can she give us any information about whether
@DanJarvisMBE , -responsible for security issues-who promised to continue to keep this issue under review,has done anything further to act on our committee’s recommendations & those raised by the Intelligence & Security Committee,led by Lord Beamish (see reply below).
Strategic ambiguity has been the order of the day. It does not deter authoritarian regimes; merely invites opportunistic aggression. If we are serious about building genuine national cyber resilience,replace vague administrative discretion with an empirical,transparent and accountable framework.I urge
@_Government_UK to embrace this vital measure & accept Amendment 164 Short summary here:
@andyburnham @KemiBadenoch @EdwardJDavey @TomTugendhat @ShabanaMahmood